9/21/2023 0 Comments Zhuge liang strategies pdf![]() ![]() We then derive the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the games. We model both situations as signaling games in which the opponent is uncertain whether the general is weak (i.e., has few soldiers) or strong (i.e., has a larger army waiting to ambush his opponent if they engage in combat). Military scholars refer to both stories to illustrate the importance of deception in warfare, often highlighting the creativity of the generals’ strategies. The stronger opposing army, uncertain whether it is facing a weak opponent or an ambush, then decides to flee and avoid battle. In both legends, the military commander faces a much stronger opposing army, but instead of ordering his men to retreat, he orders them to act in a matter consistent with baiting the enemy into an ambush. These include the legend of Li Guang and his 100 horsemen (144 BC), and the legend of Zhuge Liang and the Empty City (228 A.D.). We present game theoretic models of two of the most famous military bluffs from history. ![]()
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